Studying Oil, Islam, and Women as if Political Institutions Mattered by Kang, Alice
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Faculty Publications: Political Science Political Science, Department of 
2009 
Studying Oil, Islam, and Women as if Political Institutions 
Mattered 
Alice Kang 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, akang2@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscifacpub 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Kang, Alice, "Studying Oil, Islam, and Women as if Political Institutions Mattered" (2009). Faculty 
Publications: Political Science. 42. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscifacpub/42 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science, Department of at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications: 
Political Science by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
560 POLrrICS 6 GENDER 5(4) 2009 
Rizzo, H., A. H. Abdel-Latif, and K. Meyer. 2007. "The Relationship between Gender 
Equality and Democracy: A Comparison of Arab versus Non-Arab Muslim Societies". 
Sociology - Journal of the British Sociological Association 41 (6): 1151- 70. 
Ross, Michael L. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics 53: 325-61. 
--. 2004. "How Do Natural Resources Influence 'Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen 
Cases." International Organization 58 (I): 35-67. 
--. 2006. "A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War." Annual Review of Political 
Science 9: 265- 300. 
--.2008. "Oil, Islam, and Women." American Political Science Review 102 (February): 
107-23. 
Snyder. Richard. 2006. "Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of 
Extraction Framework." Comparative Political Studies 39 (8): 943-68. 
Studying Oil, Islam, and Women as if Political 
Institutions Mattered 
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By asserting that oil, not Islam, hurts gender equality, Michael Ross (2008) 
has made an important contribution to the debate on whether Islam bodes 
ill for women (Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Spierings, Smits, and 
Verloo 2009). Ross suggests that oil production decreases the number of 
female workers in countries with occupational segregation. The more 
women are left out of the formal economy, the fewer opportunities and 
resources they have for becoming influential political constituencies. 
According to Ross, "[t]his leaves oil-producing states with atypically 
strong patriarchal cultures and political institutions" (p. 107). Employing 
the same set of countries and data used in Ross (2008), I show that the 
institution of gender quotas, which is omitted from his statistical 
analyses, offsets the effects of oil rents on women's political 
representation. Gender quotas increase women's representation in 
Muslim majority and non-Muslim majority countries and in countries 
that are oil rich and oil pOOL! That "petroleum perpetuates patriarchy" 
(p. 120) is a tendency, not destiny. 
I thank Michael Ross for sharing his data and for responding to my questions. I thank Mark 
Copclovitch. Stephane Lavcrtu, Kathleen Klaus. Aili Mari Tripp. and participants at the 
Comparative Rescarch Colloquium at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, for their comments. 
l. I make a conscious decision to use the term "Muslim majority." In Muslim majority countries, 
morc than 50% of the population identify as Muslim. In Islamic countries, Islam is adopted as the 
state religion. 
Copyright 2009 University of Chicago Press. Used by permission.
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The Role of Political Institutions 
Ross recognizes that political institutions affect women's chances of taking 
office. 2 His models include measures of democracy, proportional-
representation electoral system, closed party lists, and district magnitude. 
To better capture the causal process by which women are elected, I 
suggest two modifications. 
First, include quotas in models of political representation inasmuch as 
in-depth country and cross-national studies demonstrate that gender 
quotas have become a "fast track" for women seeking public office since 
1995 (Bhavnani 2009; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Htun and Jones 
2002; Jones 1998; Paxton, Hughes, and Painter n.d.; Tripp and Kang 
2008). As of 2008, more than 100 countries around the world use 
voluntary political party and compulsory legal quotas. Out of 49 
predominantly Muslim countries, 22 (44.9%) have adopted quotas. Of 
64 countries that produced more than $100 in oil rents in a single year, 
33 (51.6%) have adopted quotas (see Table 1). Ross's model appears to 
obtain more accurate estimations by including quotas. 
Second, consider how institutions and natural resources shape one 
another to better understand the conditions under which resources 
generate gendered effects. Political institutions may alter the incentive 
structure that encourages rent-seeking behavior in resource-abundant 
countries (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006; Robinson, Torvik, and 
Verdier 2006). In the absence of a quota system, leaders may be more 
likely to ignore the demands of the female electorate during an oil 
boom. When quotas are in place, leaders may cater more to women's 
demands even during an oil boom. In an authoritarian state, leaders may 
disregard women's demands when oil is plentiful, whereas leaders in a 
democratic state may seek out female voters by using oil revenues to 
provide jobs, education, and health care. A similar hypothesis can be 
made about the effects of electoral systems on the use of nahlral resources. 
Data and Results 
Replicating Ross's cross-sectional analysis, I examine whether political 
institutions offset the impact of oil on women's political representation. 
The dependent variable is Female Seats, the percentage of women in 
2. In this essay, institutions are "rules and procedures (both formal and informal) that stTlicture social 
interaction by constraining and enabling actors' behavior" (Helmkc and Levitsky 2004, 727), 
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Table 1. Gender quotas for lower house and unicameral seats in oil-rich 
countries, 1960-2008 (years where oil rents exceeded S100 per capita) 
With Quotas, Year the First Quota Was Adopted 
Albania (1974-85) 2001 Hungary (1979-85) 1999 
Algeria (1967 -2006) 2002 Indonesia (1974-85, 2005) 2003 
Angola (1974-2006) 2005 Iraq (1960-2006) 2004 
Argentina (1974-2006) 1991 Israel (1971-75) 1997 
Australia (1973-2006) 1994 Lithuania (1974-81) 1996 
Austria (1979-81) 1986 Mexico (1974-2006) 1993 
Bolivia (1974-2006) 1997 Netherlands (l9n-2006) 1987 
Bosnia & Herzegovina (1985-95) 2001 Norway (1975-2006) 1975 
Brazil (2005-6) 1986 Peru (1979-85) 1997 
Cameroon (1979-90) 1996 Romania (1974-2006) 2001 
Canada (1960-2006) 1992 Sudan (2005) 2005 
Chile (1980-83) 1988 Tunisia (1974-85,1987, 2004 
1990, 2005) 
Colombia (1974-2006) 1999 Ukraine (2006) 1992 
Croatia (1984-90) 2000 United Kingdom (1977-87, 1992 
1990-92, 1996, 2000-6) 
Denmark (1985,1990,2000-6) 1985 Uzbekistan (1987-2006) 2004 
Ecuador (1973-2005) 1997 Venezuela (1960-2006) 1998 
Egypt (1977-87, 90, 2005-6) 1979 
With No Quotas 
Azerbaijan (1985-2006) 
Bahrain (1960-2006) 
Barbados (1984-85) 
Brunei Darussalam (1960-2006) 
Central African Republic (1994-200 I) 
Chad (2004-5) 
Congo, Republic (1973-2006) 
Equatorial Guinea (1995 -2006) 
Gabon (1965-2005) 
Iran (1960-2006) 
Kazakhstan (1985 - 2006) 
Kuwait (1960-2006) 
Libya (1962-2006) 
Malaysia (1976-2006) 
New Zealand (1980-2006) 
Nigeria (1973-2006) 
Oman (1964-2006) 
Papua New Guinea (1993,1996) 
Qatar (1960 - 2006) 
Russia (1965- 2006) 
Saudi Arabia (1960-2006) 
Suriname (1999-2004) 
Syria (1974-2006) 
Tajikistan (1974-2001) 
Thailand (2006) 
Trinidad and Tobago (1960-2006) 
Turkmenistan (1978-2006) 
United Arab Emirates (1968-2006) 
United States (1960-2006) 
Vietnam (1971-85) 
Yemen (1989-91,1994-97,1999-2006) 
Note: Several countries dropped their quotas (c.g., Colombia, Egypt). Years of quota adoption arc from 
International IDEA (2009), Dahlerup (2006), and Krook (2009). Oil rent years arc from Ross's 
longitudinal data set. 
lower house and unicameral parliaments in 2002 or the most recent year 
for which the data are available. Ross's key independent variable is Oil 
Rents, the value of oil and gas production minus the extraction costs 
divided by the midyear population. Oil Rents and other economic 
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variables are measured in constant 2000 dollars. I add Quotas, a 
dichotomous variable of whether voluntary party quotas or any legally 
mandated quotas were in effect for the election reported in Ross's data 
set. Information on quotas is compiled from the Global Database of 
Quotas for Women, Dahlerup (2006), and Krook (2009). 
The percentage of women in parliament averages 15.7% in oil-poor 
countries, in contrast to 12.4% in oil-rich countries (Table 2, replicating 
Ross's Table 3). I further disaggregate the sample by Quotas. Oil-rich 
countries with quotas have on average slightly higher rates of female 
representation than oil-poor countries with quotas, unless the sample is 
limited to countries not in the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). The descriptive statistics support Ross's idea 
that oil's impact in developing countries differs from that of OECD 
countries. Oil-producing countries seem less friendly to women given 
that 27.0% of oil-rich countries, while half of oil-poor countries have 
quotas. Nevertheless, the descriptive statistics indicate that quotas should 
be included in models predicting rates of women's representation. 
Table 3 reestimates Ross's ordinary least squares (OLS) models (see his 
Table 4). The presence of quotas is positively and significantly correlated 
with women's representation when controlling for oil rents, female labor 
force participation (model 6) and political institutions like democracy 
and electoral system (model 7). The findings are robust to various model 
specifications (including region dummies, excluding the two most 
influential cases) with the exception of a model that includes a control 
variable for closed lists electoral systems, which had a smaller sample of 
Table 2. Parliamentary seats held by women, 2002 (percentage) 
Muslim 
majority 
Non-Muslim 
majority 
Non-Mu;lim 
majority 
(nol1- . 
OECD) 
All 
No Quota 
(n = 27) 
4.1 
15.4 
12.3 
10.0 
Oil Rich 
Quota All No Quota 
(n = 10) (n = 37) (n = 63) 
13.5 5.8 8.5 
21.5 17.4 13.5 
16.1 13.1 n.o 
19.1 12.4 12.7 
Note: Oil-rich countries generate at least $100 per capita in oil rents. 
Oil POOT 
Quota 
(n = 63) 
12.9 
19.8 
17.3 
18.8 
All 
(n = 126) 
10.6 
16.6 
15.0 
15.7 
VI 
0\ 
-"" 
Table 3. Cross-sectional OLS regressions on female seats in parliament 
Ross Model 4 Modified 4 Ross Model 5 Modified 5 Ross Model 7 Modified 7 Interaction 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Tenn (7) 
Income (log) 0.320* ** 0.276** 0.329* .* 0.2S4*·' 0.367* * * 0.351**· 0.311 *.* 
(3.41) (2.9S) (3.74) (3.27) (4.13) (4.06) (3.73) 
Middle East -0.193* -O.ISS** -O.OS -0.065 -0.253·* * -0.25S*·* -0.267** 
(2.42) (2.72) (0.S4) (0.77) (3.2S) (3.74) (5.15) 
Islam -0.1"39 -0.132 -0.103 -0.095 -0.144 -0.156 
(I. 56) (1.63 ) ( 1.17) (1.22 ) (1.50) (LSI) 
Oil rents -0.21S*·* -0.167** -0.152* -0.104 -O.23S*** -0.207** -0.014 
(3.32) (2.S6) (2.16) (1.65) (3.46) (3.21) (0.04) 
Polity -0.29S** -0.322** 
(2.94) (3.IS) 
Proportional 0.316**' 0.265*** 
representation 
(4.30) (3.S6) a Female LFP 0.309*** 0.314*** 
(3.6S) (3.95) c: 
-" Quotas 0.261*** 0.263* * * O.23S*·* 0.300* * CS (3.5S) (3.77) (3.49) (2.S6) CJ:l 
Oil'Quotas 0.192 <#-
(0.50) (') M 
Observations 161 161 160 160 161 161 161 Z 
R-squared 0.26 0.33 0.33 0.39 0.35 0.40 0.32 0 M 
" Notes: Dependent variable is parliamentary seats held by women (%). 2002. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are standardized .• Significant at 5%; VI 
'*signifieant at 1%; ·"significant at 0.1%. -:+:: 
tv 
C> 
C> 
-D 
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88 countries. In a reduced-form simulation using Clarify 2.0, where the 
value of income is set at the mean and the country is not in the Middle 
East, the percentage of women in parliament in the absence of oil and 
absence of quotas is 14%. If quotas are introduced, the percentage 
increases to 19.1 % (an increase of 36%). If there are no quotas and the 
amount of oil rents is $1,280 (about a one standard deviation rise from 
0), the percentage of women in parliament decreases from 14% to 12.1 %. 
To assess whether institutions mitigate the impact of oil, I include an 
interaction term (Oil Rents x Quotas) in a baseline model that includes 
controls for income and the Middle East region (model 7). The standard 
results table, however, does not provide much useful information when 
using multiplicative interaction models. In particular, the insignificance 
of the interaction term does not imply the absence of meaningful 
intervening effects (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006, p. 74). To assess 
whether the marginal effect of oil rents differs between quota and non-
quota-holding countries, it is necessary to go an extra step. Figure 1 
o 
Quotas 
FIGURE I. Coefficients relating oil rents to women's political representation, at 
different levels of quotas (hase model). (Figure assembled with coding from 
Braumoeller 2004,) 
566 POLITICS 6 GENDER 5(4) 2009 
illustrates how the coefficients and confidence intervals on oil rents vary 
across different levels of quotas. In the absence of quotas, the effect of oil 
rents on women's representation is significantly negative, supporting 
Ross's claim that oil reduces women's representation. In the presence of 
quotas, the effect of oil rents on women's representation is not 
statistically significant as zero falls within the 95% confidence interval, 
which calls for further investigation into the role of institutions. 
Conclusion 
In this essay, I have argued that scholars should also consider how political 
institutions affect the resource curse on women. Four pressing questions 
emerge: 
I. What is the effect of oil on women's mobilization and movement success? 
Does oil production make it more difficult for women in parliament to 
influence politics? 
2. What are the causal mechanisms by which political institutions mitigate the 
perverse effects of oil? Do institutions alter the economic aspects of the 
gendered resource curse (i.e., Dutch disease) or do institutions lessen the 
resource curse by changing the incentives that rent-seeking leaders face? 
3. To what extent are institutions endogenous to natural resources? Why do 
some oil-producing countries adopt gender quotas while others do not? 
Quota adoption may not be endogenous to previous levels of female 
representation (Paxton, Hughes, and Painter, n.d.). Yet Table 2 indicates 
that quotas may be endogenous to oil production. 
4. Do institutions also constrain the ways in which religion influences political 
outcomes for women? This replication corroborates Ross's claim that Islam, 
measured by the proportion of the population that are Muslim, does not 
correlate with lower rates of women's representation. Nuanced analyses 
suggest that the distribution of resources influences the strength of 
organized religion (Blofield 2006), as cloes the relationship between state 
and societal leaders (Charrad 200 I; Htun 2003). 
Ross's study will inspire scholars to pay more attention to the gendered 
dimensions of the resource curse. This essay finds, however, that gender 
quotas may offset the negative effect of oil rents on the presence of 
women in national parliaments. The widespread adoption of gender 
quotas has increased women's parliamentary representation in Muslim 
majority and non-Muslim majority countries and in oil-rich and oil-poor 
countries. Our understanding of the factors that help improve women's 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 567 
lives will grow, so long as we consider how political institutions mitigate -
or exacerbate - the pernicious effect of natural resources on women. 
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Teri L. Caraway, University of Minnesota 
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The publication in 2008 of Michael Ross's "Oil, Islam, and Women" by 
the discipline's flagship journal, the American Political Science Review, is 
a welcome development. It is the first empirical work with a primary 
focus on gender and political economy ever published in the journal 
and portends well for the development of research that focuses on such 
questions. My essay has two foci. The first is a critical engagement with 
Ross's analysis of why oil production negatively affects women's 
employment prospects. The second is how to further develop the study 
of gender in the comparative political economy of labor markets. 
Oil and Women's Employment 
Ross's argument about the effect of oil on women's employment hinges on 
how Dutch disease interacts with gender segregation in labor markets to 
produce low female labor-force participation rates. One of the important 
effects of Dutch disease is a decline in the traded goods sector and an 
expansion in the nontraded goods sector. Ross asserts that because 
women workers are concentrated in the tradable sector and male workers 
in the nontradable sector, Dutch disease has gendered effects on 
employment. Since demand for women's labor falls - as a consequence 
of the contraction of the tradable sector - so do women's wages. 
Women are thus more reluctant to enter the labor market. In the 
nontradable sector, which is dominated by male workers, wages increase 
as a result of the higher demand for their labor. The increase in male 
wages also affects women's "reservation wage" - the wage that women 
must be paid to make it worthwhile to enter the workforce. If men earn 
high wages, then women are reluctant to enter the workforce. Women 
will only work if they have the potential to earn substantial wages, but 
since they are concentrated in the contracting tradable sector, such 
